ELECTORAL CYCLES AND POLICY EFFECTIVENESS: EVIDENCE FROM SOCIAL ASSISTANCE PROGRAMS IN MONGOLIA
Keywords:
Social Assistance Programs, Electoral Cycles, Policy Effectiveness, Interrupted Time-Series Analysis, Clientelism, Cash Transfers, MongoliaAbstract
This study examines how political incentives influence the effectiveness of social assistance programs (SAPs) in Mongolia, using the Newly-Married Couple Money Program as a case study. The impact of both starting and ending the program is examined by employing multiple interventions in the Interrupted Time Series Analysis on the data of marriages from 2000 to 2019.
From the obtained results, one can see that the introduction of the program leads to the sudden growth in the rate of marriages, while its termination shows the gradual decrease in the rate of marriage until the program ended. Thus, the program had proven its success at affecting people's choices positively, yet was not capable of providing sustainable behavior modification. As a result, this paper demonstrates the inefficiency of SAPs and provides insights into the influence of political incentives on policy execution.
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